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HIGHLY LOPSIDED INFORMATION AND THE BOREL
HIERARCHY
SAMUEL A. ALEXANDER1
Abstract. In a game where both contestants have perfect information, there
is a strict limit on how perfect that information can be. By contrast, when one
player is deprived of all information, the limit on the other player’s information
disappears, admitting a hierarchy of levels of lopsided perfection of informa-
tion. We turn toward the question of when the player with super-perfect
information has a winning strategy, and we exactly answer this question for a
specific family of lopsided-information games which we call guessing games.
1. Introduction
Suppose Alice and Bob are playing an infinite game together and Alice has no
information at all about what moves Bob makes. Formally this means Alice is
only permitted to use strategies which do not depend on Bob’s moves. Under this
strong restriction, a strategy for Alice is really just a fixed move-sequence: loosely
speaking, she decides all of her moves before the game ever begins. This opens
the possibility for Bob to have “better than perfect” information. At the highest
extreme, we could allow Bob to know Alice’s entire move-sequence before he even
makes his first move. Between that and what is normally called “perfect” informa-
tion, there is a hierarchy of possible perfection. If Bob has perfect information in
the traditional sense [3] of the word, then for every move he makes, he obtains a
single ∆0 fact about Alice’s move-sequence. By contrast, we could allow that with
every move he makes, one ∆1 fact is revealed to Bob, or one ∆2 fact, etc.
Suppose S ⊆ NN is a fixed subset of Baire space. The guessing game for S is
as follows. Alice chooses a sequence f : N → N, which may or may not be in S.
The fact that this is chosen in advance corresponds to Alice having no information
about Bob’s moves. Now Bob tries to “guess” (formally: play 1 or 0) whether or
not f is in S. The terms of Alice’s sequence are revealed to him one-by-one and he
gets to revise his guess with each revelation, and he wins if his guesses converge to
the correct answer, otherwise Alice wins. If Bob has a winning strategy, S is said
to be guessable. In an earlier paper [1], I demonstrated that S is guessable if and
only if S ∈∆02, the boldface pointclass of the Borel hierarchy. I will generalize this
result to higher-order guessing games which correspond to one player having more
and more lopsided information.
The way in which Alice is forced, by lack of information, to choose her moves
before the game begins, bears some resemblance to an auxiliary game invented by
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Donald Martin [4] in which, at a certain point, one player plays a quasi-strategy
and in so doing locks himself into always playing within that quasi-strategy.
2. Zeroth-Order Guessability
In this section I will formally introduce guessability. The basic definition does
not clearly generalize to higher orders, so an equivalent definition will be proved
(using some basic first-order logic) which generalizes more smoothly.
Definition 1. Suppose S ⊆ NN. A function G : N<N → N is said to guess S (and
we say G is a guesser for S) if and only if, for every f ∈ NN,
lim
n→∞
G(f(0), . . . , f(n)) =
{
1, if f ∈ S;
0, if f 6∈ S.
If any such G exists, we say S is guessable.
Lemma 2. Let S ⊆ NN. Suppose Alice and Bob are playing natural numbers, that
Bob has perfect information (in the usual sense) but Alice has no information, and
that Bob wins if either
(1) Alice’s move-sequence is in S and Bob’s moves are eventually always 1, or
(2) Alice’s move-sequence is not in S, and Bob’s moves are eventually always
0.
Then Bob has a winning strategy if and only if S is guessable.
Proof. If Bob has a winning strategy, then define G(f(0), . . . , f(n)) to be the nth
move Bob makes according to that strategy, assuming Alice’s move-sequence begins
with (f(0), . . . , f(n)). Conversely, if S is guessable, say with guesser G, a winning
strategy for Bob’s nth move is to play G(f(0), . . . , f(n)) where f(i) denotes Alice’s
ith move. 
In [1] I showed that the guessable sets are precisely the ∆0
2
sets; this will also
be a special case of a later theorem in the present paper.
I want to give an alternate characterization of guessability which will generalize
more easily. This will require some technical machinery from basic logic.
Definition 3.
• By Lmax I mean the first-order language which has a constant symbol n for
every n ∈ N; an n-ary function symbol w˜ for every function w : Nn → N; an
n-ary predicate symbol p˜ for every subset p ⊆ Nn; a special unary function
symbol f ; and, for every function G : Nn×N<N → N, an (n+1)-ary function
symbol G ◦ f .
• For any f : N→ N, the structure Mf for the language Lmax is defined as
follows. It has universe N. It interprets n, w˜, and p˜ in the obvious ways. It
interprets f as f . And for every G : Nn × N<N → N, Mf interprets G ◦ f
as the function
(G ◦ f)Mf (m1, . . . ,mn,m) = G(m1, . . . ,mn, f(0), . . . , f(m)).
• If φ is an Lmax-sentence and σ ∈ N
<N, say that φ is determined by σ if
for every f, g ∈ NN which extend σ, Mf |= φ iff Mg |= φ.
In the following lemma and all of the paper, by “quantifier-free” I really mean
it: not even bounded quantifiers are allowed (by contrast, some authors take
“quantifier-free” to mean “all quantifiers bounded”).
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Lemma 4. If φ is a quantifier-free Lmax-sentence and f : N → N, then there is
some k big enough that (f(0), . . . , f(k)) determines φ.
Proof. First, I claim that if t is an Lmax-term with no free variables then there is a
k large enough that tMg = tMf whenever g ∈ NN extends (f(0), . . . , f(k)). This is
a straightforward induction on the complexity of t. I omit most cases, but just for
one example, suppose t is (G ◦ f)(u0, . . . , un) where G : N
n × N<N → N and where
u0, . . . , un are simpler terms. By induction, find k0, . . . , kn such that each u
Mg
i =
u
Mf
i whenever g ∈ N
N extends (f(0), . . . , f(ki)). Let k = max{k0, . . . , kn, u
Mf
n }.
Suppose g ∈ NN extends (f(0), . . . , f(k)). Then
(G ◦ f)(u0, . . . , un)
Mg = (G ◦ f)Mg (u
Mg
0 , . . . , u
Mg
n )
= G(u
Mg
0 , . . . , u
Mg
n−1, g(0), . . . , g(u
Mg
n ))
= G(u
Mf
0 , . . . , u
Mf
n−1, g(0), . . . , g(u
Mf
n ))
= G(u
Mf
0 , . . . , u
Mf
n−1, f(0), . . . , f(u
Mf
n ))
= (G ◦ f)(u0, . . . , un)
Mf ,
as desired.
From this, the lemma follows by induction on the complexity of φ. 
The above lemma would still hold if we allowed bounded quantifiers, but the
proof would be more complicated.
Corollary 5. If φ is a quantifier-free Lmax-sentence then
[φ] := {f ∈ NN : Mf |= φ}
is a clopen subset of Baire space.
Proof. Openness is by Lemma 4. Closure follows since [φ]c = [¬φ]. 
If f : N→ N and if φ is an Lmax-sentence, I will write f(φ) for the number
f(φ) =
{
1 if Mf |= φ;
0 otherwise.
In other words, f(φ) = 1 if and only if f ∈ [φ].
Proposition 6. Suppose S ⊆ NN. Then S is guessable if and only if there exists
a countable set Σ of symbols of Lmax, a listing φ0, φ1, . . . of all the quantifier-
free sentences of Lmax ∩ Σ, and a function G : {0, 1}
<N → N such that for every
f : N→ N,
lim
n→∞
G(f(φ0), . . . f(φn)) =
{
1, if f ∈ S;
0, if f 6∈ S.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose S is guessable, say with guesser G0 : N
<N → N. Let Σ be
the symbol-set containing f and n for every n ∈ N. Let φ0, φ1, . . . be any listing
of the quantifier-free Lmax ∩ Σ sentences. Define G : {0, 1}
<N → N as follows.
Suppose (p0, . . . , pn) ∈ {0, 1}
<N. Say a formula φ appears if φ = φi for some i ≤ n
and pi = 1. Find a maximum-length sequence (n0, . . . , nk) such that for each
i = 0, . . . , k, the formula f(i) = ni appears, and let G(p0, . . . , pn) = G0(n0, . . . , nk);
if (n0, . . . , nk) is not uniquely determined or no such nonempty sequence exists, let
G(p0, . . . , pn) = 0.
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I claim this witnesses the theorem’s conclusion. Let f ∈ S. Since G0 guesses
S, find n0 so big that ∀n ≥ n0, G0(f(0), . . . , f(n)) = 1. Since φ0, φ1, . . . is an
exhaustive list, there is some k0 so big that (φ0, . . . , φk0 ) includes all the sentences
f(i) = f(i) for i = 1, . . . , n0. For each such i, f(f(i) = f(i)) = 1, so each formula
f(i) = f(i) appears in the definition of G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φk)) for any k > k0. So for
any k > k0, G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φk)) = G0(f(0), . . . , f(n)) for some n ≥ n0, so equals
1. So G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φk))→ 1 as k →∞, as desired. A similar argument goes for
the case f 6∈ S.
(⇐) Suppose Σ, φ0, φ1, . . ., and G0 : {0, 1}
<N → N are as in the theorem’s
conclusion. Define G : N<N → N as follows. Given any sequence (m0, . . . ,mn) ∈
N
<N, let k ≤ n be maximal such that for every i = 0, . . . , k, φi is determined by
(m0, . . . ,mn) (if there is no such k, arbitrarily define G(m0, . . . ,mn) = 0). Let
G(m0, . . . ,mn) = G0(f(φ0), . . . , f(φk)) for any f : N→ N extending (m0, . . . ,mn),
well-defined since (m0, . . . ,mn) determines φ0, . . . , φk.
I claim G guesses S. Suppose f ∈ S. By hypothesis, there is some k0 such
that ∀k ≥ k0, G0(f(φ0), . . . , f(φk)) = 1. By Lemma 4, we can find some j0 such
that φ0, . . . , φk0 are all determined by (f(0), . . . , f(j0)). Then for any j ≥ j0,
G(f(0), . . . , f(j)) = G0(f(φ0), . . . , f(φk)) for some k ≥ k0. So for any such j,
G(f(0), . . . , f(j)) = 1, as desired. The case f 6∈ S is similar. 
Corollary 7. Let S ⊆ NN. Suppose Alice and Bob are playing natural numbers
and neither can see the other’s moves. But at the start of the game, Bob is allowed
to choose a countable subset Σ of Lmax and a listing φ0, φ1, . . . of the quantifier-
free Σ-sentences, and then, on his nth move, Bob is told whether or not φn holds
of Alice’s move-sequence (he is told this by a reliable third party, without Alice’s
knowledge). Suppose the winning conditions are as in Lemma 2. Then Bob has a
winning strategy if and only if S is guessable.
Proof. If Bob has a winning strategy, let Σ and φ0, φ1, . . . be as dictated by that
strategy. For any (p0, . . . , pn) ∈ {0, 1}
<N, let G(p0, . . . , pn) be the move dictated
by Bob’s strategy assuming Bob is told that Alice’s move-sequence satisfies φi for
each pi = 1 (i ≤ n) and ¬φi for each pi = 0 (i ≤ n).
Conversely, suppose S is guessable. Let Σ, φ0, φ1, . . ., and G : {0, 1}
<N → N
be as provided by Proposition 6. A winning strategy for Bob is to choose Σ,
φ0, φ1, . . . at the beginning, and then always play G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) where f is
Alice’s move-sequence; he can do this using the information he is given. 
3. Higher-Order Guessability
Proposition 6 provides a way to generalize guessability, giving us a foothold into
a hierarchy of super-perfect information. The Σn and Πn formulas of a language are
defined inductively: Σ0 = Π0 = ∆0 is the set of quantifier-free formulas (bounded
quantifiers not allowed); having defined Σn and Πn, let
Σn+1 = {∃xφ : φ ∈ Πn, x any variable}
Πn+1 = {∀xφ : φ ∈ Σn, x any variable}.
An Lmax formula is ∆n+1 if it is equivalent (over all the models Mf ) to some
Σn+1 formula and also to some Πn+1 formula of Lmax.
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Definition 8. Let S ⊆ NN, m ∈ N. We say S is mth-order guessable if there
exists a countable set Σ of Lmax-symbols, a listing φ0, φ1, . . . of all ∆m sentences
of Lmax ∩ Σ, and a function G : {0, 1}
<N → N such that for every f : N→ N,
lim
n→∞
G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) =
{
1, if f ∈ S;
0, if f 6∈ S.
Thus, Proposition 6 can be restated as follows: “S ⊆ NN is guessable if and only
if it is 0th-order guessable.”
Lemma 9. Modify the game in Corollary 7 by changing “quantifier-free” to “∆m”.
Then Bob has a winning strategy if and only if S is mth-order guessable.
Proof. Immediate. 
The main theorem of the paper will be that mth-order guessability is equivalent
to ∆02 if m = 0 or to ∆
0
m+1 if m 6= 0. We will begin working toward that result
now.
Definition 10. Let ∆
′
2 = ∆
0
2. For every m > 2, define ∆
′
m as follows: a set
S ⊆ NN is in ∆
′
m if and only if S is a countable union of countable intersections of
∆0m−2 sets and also a countable intersection of countable unions of ∆
0
m−2 sets.
Lemma 11. If m = 2 then ∆
′
m =∆
0
2. If m > 2 then ∆
′
m =∆
0
m−1.
Proof. The m = 2 case is true by definition. Suppose m > 2. First I claim
∆
′
m ⊆∆
0
m−1. Suppose S is ∆
′
m. Then S = ∩i∈N ∪j∈N Dij = ∪i∈N ∩j∈N Eij where
the Dij , Eij are ∆
0
m−2. In particular, the Dij are Σ
0
m−2, so for every i, ∪j∈NDij is
Σ0m−2. Thus S is Π
0
m−1. Similarly, since the Eij are Π
0
m−2, S is Σ
0
m−1. So S is
∆0m−1.
Conversely, suppose S is ∆0m−1. Then S = ∪i∈N ∩j∈N Sij = ∩i∈N ∪j∈N Pij where
the Sij are Σ
0
m−3 (or the Sij are basic-open if m = 3) and the Pij are Π
0
m−3 (or
complements of basic-open if m = 3). So the Pij and Sij are ∆
0
m−2, which shows
S is ∆
′
m. 
Say that S ⊆ NN is defined by an Lmax sentence φ if S = [φ]. As an example,
the set of surjections is defined by ∀x∃y f(y) = x.
My interest in defining Borel sets by formulas in a powerful language, as in the
following lemma, is partially influenced by Vanden Boom [5] pp. 276–277. In [2] I
give a similar result using a weaker but slightly nonstandard language.
Lemma 12. Let S ⊆ NN. For n > 0, S is Σ0n (resp. Π
0
n, ∆
0
n) if and only if S is
defined by a Σn (resp. Πn, ∆n) sentence of Lmax.
Proof. Write [f0] for the collection of infinite extensions of a finite sequence f0 ∈
N
<N.
(⇒) Suppose S is Σ0n. If n is even, write S = ∪i1∈N · · · ∩in∈N [fi1···in ]
c where
each fi1···in ∈ N
<N (we can assume the fi1···in are nonempty). If n is odd, write
S = ∪i1∈N · · ·∪in∈N[fi1···in ]. Let ℓ : N
n → N be defined by letting ℓ(i1, . . . , in) be the
length of fi1···in , minus 1. Define τ : N
n×N<N → N by τ(i1, . . . , in, a1, . . . , ak) = 1
if (a1, . . . , ak) = fi1···in , τ = 0 everywhere else. Then for any f : N→ N, f extends
fi1···in if and only if
τ(i1, . . . , in, f(0), . . . , f(ℓ(i1, . . . , in))) = 1
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So if n is even, then S is defined by the Lmax sentence
∃x1 · · · ∀xn(τ ◦ f)(x1, . . . , xn, ℓ˜(x1, . . . , xn)) = 0.
And if n is odd, then S is defined by the Lmax sentence
∃x1 · · · ∃xn(τ ◦ f)(x1, . . . , xn, ℓ˜(x1, . . . , xn)) = 1.
The case Π0n case is similar, and the ∆
0
n case follows.
(⇐) Induction on n. For the base case, suppose S is defined by (say) the Σ1
sentence ∃xφ where φ is quantifier-free. Corollary 5 ensures [φ(x|i)] is clopen for
any i ∈ N. Thus S = ∪i∈N[φ(x|i)] is open, so Σ
0
1. Similarly for the Π1 and ∆1
cases. With the base case done, the induction case is straightforward. 
Proposition 13. If S ⊆ NN is ∆
′
m+2 then S is mth-order guessable.
Proof. Case 1: m > 0. Then S is a ∪∩ of∆0m sets and also a ∩∪ of∆
0
m sets. Write
S = ∪i∈N ∩j∈NDij = ∩i∈N ∪j∈N Eij where the Dij , Eij are ∆
0
m. By Lemma 12, we
may find ∆m sentences σij defining each Dij , and ∆m sentences τij defining each
Eij . Let Σ be the (countable) set of Lmax symbols appearing in the σij and τij .
Let φ0, φ1, . . . be any listing of all the ∆m sentences of Lmax ∩ Σ. I shall define a
function G : {0, 1}<N → N which will witness the mth-order guessability of S.
I’ll defineG in terms of two functions µ, ν : {0, 1}<N → N. Suppose (p0, . . . , pn) ∈
{0, 1}<N. Say that a sentence φi appears if i ≤ n and pi = 1. Let µ(p0, . . . , pn)
be the minimum x ∈ N such that there is no y ∈ N such that ¬σxy appears. Let
ν(p0, . . . , pn) be the minimum x ∈ N such that there is no y ∈ N such that τxy
appears. Finally, let G(p0, . . . , pn) = 1 if µ(p0, . . . , pn) < ν(p0, . . . , pn) and let
G(p0, . . . , pn) = 0 otherwise.
I claim Σ, φ0, φ1, . . . , G witnesses the mth-order guessability of S. First, suppose
f ∈ S. I must show limn→∞G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) = 1. Since f ∈ S = ∪i∈N∩j∈NDij ,
we have f ∈ ∩j∈NDij for some i. So f ∈ Dij for every j. Thus Mf |= σij for every
j, and thus ¬σij cannot appear in the definition of µ(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) for any n.
Thus µ is bounded above by i. I claim limn→∞ ν(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) = ∞, which
will show that ν is eventually always above µ and thus that G converges to 1. It
is enough to let i ∈ N be arbitrary and show ν(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) 6= i for all n
sufficiently large. Well, Sc = ∪i∈N ∩j∈NE
c
ij , and f 6∈ S
c, so for any arbitrary i ∈ N,
there is some j such that f ∈ Eij , whence Mf |= τij . Thus, for any n large enough
that φ0, . . . , φn includes τij , τij appears in the definition of ν(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)), so
ν(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) 6= i. There is such a sufficiently large n, because τij is ∆m.
A similar argument shows that limn→∞G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) = 0 if f 6∈ S.
Case 2: m = 0. This case is similar to Case 1, but instead of writing S as a ∪∩
of ∆0m sets, write it as a ∪∩ of complements of basic open sets. And instead of
writing S as a ∩∪ of ∆0m sets, write it as a ∩∪ of basic open sets. Then take the
τij and σij to be quantifier-free formulas in the obvious way. 
Proposition 14. If S ⊆ NN is mth-order guessable, then S is ∆
′
m+2.
Proof. Suppose S is mth-order guessable. There is a countable set Σ of Lmax
symbols and a listing φ0, φ1, . . . of all the ∆m sentences of Lmax∩Σ, and a function
G : {0, 1}<N → N which witnesses the mth-order guessability of S. For any f :
N → N, f ∈ S if and only if G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) is eventually always 1. Thus we
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can write
S =
⋃
i∈N
⋂
j>i
{f : G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φj)) = 1}
=
⋃
i∈N
⋂
j>i
⋃
0 ≤ a1, . . . , aj ≤ 1 and G(~a) = 1
⋂
0≤k≤j
{f : f(φk) = ak}.
Now, I claim each set {f : f(φk) = ak} is ∆
0
m if m > 0, or is clopen if m = 0. This
is because if ak = 1 then {f : f(φk) = ak} = {f : Mf |= φk}, and if ak = 0 then
{f : f(φk) = ak} = {f : Mf |= ¬φk}. Either way, we have a∆
0
m set by Lemma 12
(or a clopen set by Corollary 5, if m = 0). Since ∆0m is closed under finite unions
and intersections (as are the clopen sets), I have shown S is a countable union of
countable intersections of ∆0m sets (or of clopen sets if m = 0).
For the dual situation, note for any f : N→ N, saying G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn))→ 1
is equivalent to saying G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) = 1 for infinitely many values of n,
because limn→∞G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φn)) must exist by Definition 8. Thus
S =
⋂
i∈N
⋃
j>i
{f : G(f(φ0), . . . , f(φj)) = 1}.
Thus S is a countable intersection of countable unions of∆0m sets (or of clopen sets
if m = 0). Put together, S is ∆
′
m+2. 
Theorem 15. The 0th-order guessable sets are exactly the∆02 sets, and form > 0,
the mth-order guessable sets are exactly the ∆0m+1 sets.
Proof. By combining Propositions 13 and 14, for any m, the mth-order guessable
sets are exactly the ∆
′
m+2 sets. The theorem now follows by Lemma 11. 
In the proof of Proposition 14 we actually proved slightly more than we needed,
which leads to an unexpected standalone corollary.
Corollary 16. If S = ∪i∈N ∩j∈N Xij = ∩i∈N ∪j∈N Yij , where the Xij and Yij are
∆0n, 0 < n ∈ N, then there is a single family Zij of ∆
0
n sets such that
S = ∪i∈N ∩j∈N Zij = ∩i∈N ∪j∈N Zij .
Proof. By Proposition 13, S is nth-order guessable. Proposition 14 gives Zij . 
4. Acknowledgements
I want to thank Amit K. Gupta, Steven VanDendriessche, Timothy J. Carlson,
and Dasmen Teh for much useful feedback, and especially Mr. Gupta for catching
some mistakes in an earlier draft.
References
[1] Alexander SA (2011). On guessing whether a sequence has a certain property. J of Integer
Sequences 14.
[2] Alexander SA. The first-order syntax of variadic functions. Preprint.
[3] Gale D and Stewart FM (1953). Infinite games with perfect information. Contributions to the
theory of games, Ann of Math Studies 28, Princeton Univ Press, 245–266.
[4] Martin DA (1985). A Purely Inductive Proof of Borel Determinacy. In Proc of Symp in Pure
Math 42, AMS, 303–308.
[5] Vanden Boom, M (2007). The effective Borel hierarchy. Fundamenta Mathematicae 195, 269–
289.
